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IN THE SUPHJ::ML

t;UU.l11-

of the

STATE OF UTAH
AGNES LUNDBERG,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

LE GRAND P. BACKMAN,

Case No. 8896

I

Defendant and Respondent. 1
I

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Much of the contents of appellant's statement of the
case consists of recitals which are not evidence in the case,
respondenet's position is amply reflected by the record,
particularly is this true of the statements found on page 3,
second paragraph and page 4, last paragraph of appellant's
brief.
The issues are framed by the pleadings and affidavits.
Respondent was retained by appellant to represent her
in an action to quiet tite, to partition real property involved,
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for the sale of the property and for judgment for reasonable
rental value thereof.

Respondent timely filed answer to the

complaint and followed this filing up with an amended
answer and a counterclaim praying that title be quieted in
appellant and against the plaintiff in said action. Respondent appeared at the trial of the case having briefed the
issues raised by the pleadings, and in all respects acted
in the interest of appellant.
appellant.

The trial court ruled against

The record in this case shows by affidavit of respondent that appellant became abusive to respondent and slandered his character and reputation.

This is uncontroverted.

The record also shows that appellant paid nothing whatsoever to respondent on acount of attorney's fees.

This is

also uncontroverted.
The trial court had before it in this case the record of
the action complained of.

Respondent and appellant each

filed affidavits in support of and in objection to the motion
for summary judgment, therefore, a full dress trial could
add nothing material which was not already before the court.
Judge Larson did not rule on respondent's motion from
the bench but took same under advisement and considered
same for a considerable length of time, not only once but
on two different occasions having heard arguments the
second time when Judge Larson again took the matter under
advisement and then later denied the motion to re-open the
case.
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ARGUMENT
Point I
Respondent adopts the authorities cited by appellant
under point I in support of the judgment in this case.
An examination of appellant's complaint reveals the
fact that appellant has not stated a cause of action against
respondent.
No facts whatever are pleaded, nothing but
bare legal conclusions. Appellant has not alleged, neither
could she have proven if she had alleged, that she could have
prevailed in the action which gives rise to this case, had
respondent represented appellant in a manner other and
different from that which he did, neither did appellant so
assert in her affidavit in objection to respondent's motion for
summary judgment.
Appellant having been sued in a quiet tittle action
elected to defend the action. Having been named a defendant in the action filed and having elected to defend the action
appellant was in a much different position that she would
have been had she been encouraged to file an action by
which she incurred heavy expenses and large attorney's fees
and then had an adverse judgment entered against her.
Nothing could be added as evidence which was not already
before the court in the pleadings and in the case file out of
which this action arises, together with the affidavits of
appellant and respondent.
The cases have repeatedly held that an attorney is not
an insurer of successfully defending an action. He is not
answerable to his client for every error or mistake and he
will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good
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faith to the best of his skill and knowledge, or with at least
reasonable skill and learning and an ordinary degree of attention or care.
Appellant has not charged respondent with inattention
to the case under her first cause of action but seeks to recover
for that which she considers error of judgment.
In 34 Am. Dec. 89, 90 the law is stated:
"It is well settled that an attorney who acts in
good faith and in an honest belief that his advise and
acts are well founded and in the just interest of his
client is not answerable for a mere error of judgment
or for a mistake in a point of law."
And in 45 ALR2d 13 in the case of Seymour vs Cager
(NY) the Court said:
"A mere failure of success in the law-suit is not
prima facie evidence of negligence or want of proper
skill on the part of the attorney."
While respondent has not filed answer to the complaint
it is clearly evident that there can be no genuine issue as
to any material fact.
Point II
There is nothing in the record, nor is it shown by affidavit or otherwise wherein respondent failed to exercise
ordinary skill and care.
Appellant contends that had respondent examined the
files in his own office, he would have advised the appellant
that the asserted claims were valid and unimpeachable. This
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argument is nothing more than a bare legal conclusion fully
unsupported by facts. Here is a situation where hindsight
is better than foresight, especially after the case has been
decided against appellant.
There is a serious question whether the decree of distribution mentioned in the former action vested title to property
which had already been deeded out.
This was the position
taken by respondent. Judge Larsen had a right to assume
that with respondent having the information in his office
and having handled the previous case, respondent was aware
of the condition of the title and still honestly believed that
the deed conveying title from the surviving joint tenant to
appellant took precedence over the decree of distribution.
Now for the first time appellant contends that she could
have settled the case for $3,000.00 had she been properly
advised by respondent. There is no such assertion in appellant's affidavit, neither did appellant so allege in her complaint nor is there any evidence in the record to this effect.
Here is another case of looking back after an adverse
decision.
The contention of appellant as to this matter is wholly
speculative and not factual.
Point III
For the second cause of action appellant seeks to recover
a second $8,500.00 for loss of a $7,800.00 property after
seeking judgment in her first cause of action for $8,500.00
because as appellant contends, respondent failed to appeal
the case.
Respondent's affidavit states that he received no fee for
his ~ervices either prior to or at the time of the trial of the
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case, that appellant was abusive toward respondent and
slandered respondent, that respondent withdrew as appellant's attorney when an appeal could have been taken although the notice of withdrawal was not filed until January
24, 1955. It is to be noted that the withdrawal bears date
of December 1, 1954 and while the notice of the motion
for new trial bearing date December 3, 1954 was not filed
until December 6, 1954, respondent by affidavit states that
appellant had consulted both Wilford W. Kirton, Jr. and
Hugh B. Brown prior to the withdrawal and that appellant
had ample time to retain other counsel and to file notice
of motion for new trial and an appeal. Appellant by her
affidavit denies that the respondent withdrew on or about
Decemebr 1, 1954 and avers that the withdrawal was not
filed until January 24, 1955 hut appellant does not deny
that she consulted Mr. Kirton and Mr. Brown in time to
have appealed or that she was aware of the withdrawal of
the respondent as her attorney in ample time to have timely
appealed.
No where in the record does it appear nor does appellant
assert that at the time she engaged the services of respondent
she retained him to prosecute the case through the supreme
court if unsuccessful in the trial court. ·
Appellant having been a defendant, the entry of final
judgment terminated the attorney-client relationship. No
notice of withdrawal was necessary in the absence of an
allegation or statement by affidavit that respondent had been
employed and paid respondent to perfect an appeal.
Our own Supreme Court has had occasion to speak on
thi~ subject in the case of Sandall vs Sandall, 57U-150, 193
P l 093, 15 ALR 620. This case involved an action for a
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divorce in which defendant was represented by the firm of
Halverson and Pratt. The plaintiff having prayed for alimony in her complaint abandoned same in the trial. Judgment was entered without providing for alimony. ' After
entry of judgment, plaintiff filed a motion for modification
of the decree. A notice of the motion was served by mail
on Halverson and Pratt which notice set October 4, 1919 as
the day for hearing of the motion. Upon the attorneys for
plaintiff appearing on the motion neither defendant nor his
attorneys appeared, the clerk called Halverson by telephone
and inquired if he intended to appear in said cause, and
Halverson answered he "did not." The court then proceeded
with a hearing on the motion and entered a modification of
the decree. Notice of this order was served upon the defendant himself. Thereafter Halverson appeared as attorney
for defendant and moved the court to vacate the order which
motion was denied and an appeal was taken from the ruling
on the motion on the ground that defendant was never
served with the motion for modification and therefore the
court acquired no jurisdiction.
It is contended that notice served on Halverson and
Pratt was not sufficient in as much as they were not defendant's attorneys in the case, having been paid off.
The court speaking through Mr. Justice Thurman said:
"The authorities support the proposition that an
attorney's relation to his client ceases upon the rendition of judgment and satisfaction thereof, unless
there are disturbing events or a special arrangement
continuing the relation. The following excerpt from
6 C. J.p .. 672, 184, illustrates the trend of authority:
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"In the absence of disturbing events the employment of an attorney continues as long as the suit
or business upon which he is engaged is pending,
and ordinarily comes to an end with the completion
of the special task for which the attorney was
employed. Where the evidence as to the continuance
?£ the relation is conflicting, it is a question for the
Jury.

"It is always a presumption that an attorney is
employed to conduct the litigation to judgment,
and no further; the relation of attorney and client
and the general powers of the attorney cease
upon the rendition and entering of the judgment.
There is a distinction in this connection, however,
between cases in which the attorney is retained to
represent plaintiff, and those in which he represents
defendant; in the latter case, the entry of final judgment always terminates the relation and the attorney's authority; in the former case it is generally
the rule that the attorney's authority lasts until
satisfaction of the judgment, and that he may take
the ordinary and usual steps to secure such satisfaction."
"See also 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 327; 4 Cyc.
593; 2 R. C. L. 1004.
"There is no evidence in this case of any disturbing events or special arrangement between
Halverson & Pratt and the defendant, continuing their
relation after the entry of final decree in favor of
plaintiff in July 1910. Nothing further being required of them in connection with the case, it seems
conclusive that their professional relation with defendant ceased at that time."
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In the instant case appellant retained respondent to
defend the action which respondent did, judgment was
entered against appellant and upon entry thereof the relationship of attorney and client ceased.
Appellant contends that the trial court committed a
reversible error in assessing appellant with rent for appellant's use of the property involved in the action and seeks
to recover damages against respondent for error committed
by the court.
The position of counsel is not only rediculous but
regrettable when a member of the bar is required to face
the humiliation of an action financed by our own State
Bar having no more merit than the instant case has.
Appellant's contention that respondent failed in his duty
to represent appellant properly at the trial of the case and
that resondent failed to prosecute an appeal, appear to be
directly in conflict for had respondent made such a record
at the trial of the case that a reversal could have been had
had an appeal been prosecuted then respondent most certainly did not fail to properly represent appellant at the
trial of the case.
No error was committed by the court in granting therespondent's motion inasmuch as it is clearly evident from the
files and records in this case that there is no triable issue.
Respectfully submitted,
M. V. BACKMAN,
Attorney for Respondent
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